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Abstract. We consider the problem of answering queries against a knowledge base (KB) using secrets,
whenever it is possible to do so without compromising secrets. We study query answering against EL
knowledge bases. We provide a polynomial time algorithm that, given an EL KB Σ, a set S of secrets
to be protected and a query q or the form C(a) or r(a, b), outputs “Yes” whenever Σ  q and the
answer to q, together with the answers to any previous queries answered by the KB, does not allow
the querying agent to deduce any of the secrets in S. This approach allows more flexible information
sharing than is possible with traditional access control mechanisms.
1 Introduction
The rapid expansion of the World Wide Web and the widespread use of distributed databases and networked
information systems offer unprecedented opportunities for productive interaction and collaboration among
individuals and organizations in virtually every area of human endeavor. However, the need to share informa-
tion has to be balanced against the need to protect sensitive information. The following example illustrates
one such scenario.
Example 1. (Healthcare) (a simplified version adapted from [15]): Suppose that Jane’s mother Jill had
breast cancer. Dr. James, Jane’s physician, who is aware of Jane’s family history, concludes that Jane has a
significant risk of developing breast cancer. He asks her to undergo genetic screening for BRCA1 mutation
(which is linked to an increased risk of breast cancer) to determine the extent to which Jane is at risk of
developing breast cancer. Suppose Jane tests positive for BRCA1 mutation. Dr. James proceeds to prescribe
her a certain drug that he knows is effective at reducing the breast cancer risk for patients with BRCA1
mutation. Jane purchases the medications from her pharmacy and wants to get reimbursed for the cost of
her prescription by her insurance company. If her insurance company finds out that she has tested positive
for BRCA1 mutation or that she has been prescribed certain drug(s) for breast cancer, Jane risks losing
her health insurance. In this setting, the knowledge base (KB) needs to be able to certify to the insurance
company that Jane qualifies for reimbursement for a drug that is covered by her insurance policy without
revealing the fact that she is on such drugs. 
The preceding example illustrates the need for algorithms that can, given a knowledge base Σ and a set S
of secrets (perhaps specified using some secrecy policy1), answer queries against Σ, using secrets if necessary,
whenever it is possible to do so without compromising their confidentiality. Barring a few exceptions (see
Section 5), most existing approaches to information protection simply forbid the use of secret information
in answering queries. The privacy-preserving reasoning framework introduced in [5] was motivated by the
need to alleviate, at least in part, this important limitation of current methods for information sharing
1 Upon choosing an underlying language to express the information in the KB, a mechanism is needed to transform
the secrecy policies into secrets expressed by the chosen language. Such transformation is out of the scope of this
paper.
(or conversely, information protection) in the simple setting of hierarchical knowledge bases (KBs) under
the open world assumption (OWA)2. Such KBs may contain scientific, medical, economic information, or
military intelligence, etc. Our secrecy-preserving reasoning framework builds on, and substantially extends,
the privacy-preserving reasoning framework introduced by Bao et al. [5] (where the focus was on protecting
some class-subclass relationships in hierarchical KBs).
In general, the answer to a query q against a KB Σ can be “Yes” (i.e., q can be inferred from Σ), “No” (¬q
can be inferred from Σ) or “Unknown” (e.g., because of the incompleteness of Σ). We assume cooperative
as opposed to adversarial scenarios in which the KB does not lie. However, whenever truthfully answering
a query risks compromising secrets in S, the reasoner associated with the KB is allowed to hide the answer
to the query by feigning ignorance, i.e., answering the query as “Unknown”. Given a set of secrets which we
call the secrecy set S, it is clear that, to protect S, answers to queries about secrets in S will be “Unknown”.
However, we will show that, in general, it is not sufficient to protect only S since truthful answers to certain
queries (that are not in S) may reveal some information in S. Therefore, we must protect a superset of S,
which we call an envelope of S, such that the querying agent who has no access to the envelope will not be
able to deduce any information in S.
In this paper, we investigate secrecy-preserving query answering with EL [4], which is one of the simplest
DLs that is both computationally tractable [11, 2, 19] and practically useful [4, 22]. For example, the medical
ontology Snomed ct [27] and large parts of the medical ontology Galen [24] can be expressed in EL. We
provide algorithms to answer queries against an EL KB that use, but not reveal, the information that is
designated as secret. Because of the open world assumption and the fact that the language of EL does not
include negation, the answer to a query can only be “Yes” or “Unknown”.
To answer queries posed to the KB, we utilize a secrecy maintenance system that consists of: a finite set
of consequences of the KB Σ, denoted by A∗, and a secrecy envelope S ⊆ ES ⊆ A∗. The answer to a query
q is censored by the reasoner if q ∈ ES.
It is easy to see that a secrecy envelope always exists. For instance, A∗ constitutes an envelope for any
secrecy set S ⊆ A∗. A key challenge is to develop strategies that can be used by the KB to respond to queries
as informatively as possible (i.e., using an envelope that is as small as possible) without compromising secrets
that the KB is obliged to protect. Unfortunately, computing a minimum envelope is NP-hard.
We compute A∗ using the (usual) tableau expansion rules. To compute ES, we introduce the following
idea. From each original expansion rule, we construct a corresponding inverse expansion rule. We show that
the inverted system of expansion rules generates an envelope of S. To the best of our knowledge, the idea of
constructing a secrecy envelope by inverting the tableau expansion rules is novel. Furthermore, we introduce
a couple of useful optimizations that help reduce the size of an envelope.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the secrecy-preserving framework.
Section 3 initializes the secrecy maintenance system. We provide a tableau algorithm for computing the
consequences of the KB and two tableau algorithms for computing secrecy envelopes. Section 4 discusses
how to retrieve answers to queries. Section 5 concludes with a summary, a discussion of related work, and
an outline of some directions for further research.
2 Under the closed world assumption a statement that cannot be inferred from the KB to be true, is presumed to be
false. Under the open world assumption, the status of a statement that cannot be inferred from the KB is presumed
to be unknown, not necessarily false.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
The non-logical signature of the EL description language includes three mutually disjoint sets: a set of
concept names NC , a set of role names NR and a set of individual names NO. The syntax of EL is defined
by specifying expressions and formulae. EL expressions consist of the set of role names NR and the set of
concepts C which is recursively defined as follows:
C,D −→ A | > | C uD | ∃r.C
where A ∈ NC , > is the top symbol, C,D ∈ C and r ∈ NR. In this paper we will consider three kinds of EL
formulae: assertions of the form C(a) or r(a, b), definitions of the form A
.
= D and general concept inclusions
(GCI) of the form C v D where a, b ∈ NO, C,D ∈ C, r ∈ NR and A ∈ NC .
The semantics of EL is defined by using an interpretation I = 〈∆, ·I〉 where ∆ is a non-empty domain
and ·I is a function that maps each individual name to an element in ∆, each concept name to a subset of ∆
and each role name to a subset of ∆×∆. The interpretation of concept expressions is extended recursively
as follows: for all r ∈ NR and C,D ∈ C, (C uD)I = CI ∩DI , (∃r.C)I = {a ∈ ∆ | ∃b ∈ ∆ : (a, b) ∈ rI ∧ b ∈
CI}. For a finite set of symbols N ⊂ NC ∪ NR ∪ NO, we define an interpretation I restricted to N to be
IN = 〈∆, ·I |N 〉.
2.2 Knowledge Bases
A finite non-empty set of assertions is called an ABox. A finite set of definitions and GCIs is called a TBox.
An ABox A and a TBox T whose concepts and roles belong to the language EL form an EL-knowledge base
Σ = 〈A, T 〉. A TBox T is normalized [10] if T contains only GCIs all of which are of one of the following
forms: A v B, A1 u A2 v B, A v ∃r.B or ∃r.A v B where A,A1, A2, B ∈ NC ∪ {>}. It was shown that
transforming a TBox into such a normal form can be accomplished in polynomial time [10]. From now on,
we will assume that all the TBoxes are in normal form.
Definition 1. Let Σ = 〈A, T 〉 be a knowledge base, I = 〈∆, ·I〉 an interpretation, C,D ∈ C, r ∈ NR and
a, b ∈ NO. I satisfies C(a), r(a, b), or C v D if, respectively, aI ∈ CI , (aI , bI) ∈ rI , or CI ⊆ DI . I is a
model of Σ if it satisfies all the assertions in A and all the GCIs in T . Let α be an assertion or a GCI. We
say that Σ entails α, written as Σ  α, if all models of Σ satisfy α.
We denote by NΣ all the symbols appearing in Σ and by OΣ the set of individual names appearing in
Σ. Note that OΣ ⊂ NO ∩NΣ and NΣ \ OΣ ⊂ NC ∪NR.
2.3 Motivating Example
Example 2. (Example 1, continued.) Let Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 be a KB that contains information on the patients,
their health history, the prescriptions that they get from the physicians and their insurance information. The
scenario described in Example 1 can be more formally specified in the description logic EL as follows:
1. ∃is child.A v CancerRisk
2. HasMutBRCA1 v ∃has pres.CancerDrug
3. ∃has pres.CancerDrug v CancerRisk
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4. ∃has pres.CoveredDrug v Reimburse
5. CancerDrug v CoveredDrug
6. A v Woman
7. A v HasCancer
8. WomanuHasCancer v A
9. Woman(Jill)
10. HasCancer(Jill)
11. is child(Jane, Jill)
12. HasMutBRCA1(Jane)
The GCIs 1-8 form a subset of T1 (in normal form) and the assertions 9-12 form a subset of A1. In order for
Jane to get reimbursed, when the query Reimburse(Jane) is posed to the KB, the answer should be “Yes”.
However, in order to protect Jane’s privacy, the query CancerRisk(Jane) should be answered “Unknown”. 
2.4 The Secrecy-preserving Query Answering Problem
Given a knowledge base Σ and a finite secrecy set S, the basic goal is to answer queries while preserving
secrecy. It is obvious that protecting only secrets in S is not enough. As shown in Example 2, to protect
Jane’s privacy, the query CancerRisk(Jane) should be answered “Unknown”. However, by only keeping
CancerRisk(Jane) secret, the fact that Jane has cancer risk can still be inferred by statements 12, 2 and
3. Therefore, the secrecy-preserving query answering problem is to find a superset of S, which we call the
secrecy envelope of S, denoted by ES, so that by protecting ES, the querying agent cannot conclude anything
in S.
2.5 The Secrecy-preserving Query Answering Framework
The secrecy-preserving query answering framework is based on the OWA. Under OWA, what cannot be
inferred is considered unknown, rather than false. To protect confidential information, queries that relate to
secrets may be answered as “Unknown”. The idea is that when the answer to a query is “Unknown”, the
querying agent is not able to distinguish between (a) the answer to the query is truly unknown, or (b) the
answer is being protected for reasons of secrecy.
Our goal is to provide a decision procedure for answering queries while preserving secrecy. The framework
contains following components and it is illustrated in Fig. 1:
– A knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉.
– A secrecy set S. We assume that a secrecy set S is given as a finite set of assertions that contain only
symbols from NΣ .
– Associated with Σ, there is a reasoner R that is complete. R is used to answer queries by checking
whether the query can be inferred from Σ and if it can, whether answering “Yes” will reveal secrets from
S. The specific tasks are:
• To compute the set SubC of sub-expressions of all concepts and roles appearing in Σ or S.
• To compute the set of all assertional consequences of Σ restricted to SubC. This set is called the
assertional closure of Σ and it is denoted by A∗. We assume that S ⊆ A∗.
• To compute the secrecy envelope ES ⊆ A∗, a set of assertions that is a superset of S, which if
truthfully answered, may reveal some secret(s) in S.
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• To answer queries. If a query cannot be inferred from the knowledge base, the answer to the query
is simply “Unknown”. If it can be inferred and it is not in ES, the final answer is “Yes”; otherwise,
the answer is “Unknown”.
– A querying agent who asks queries of the form C(a) or r(a, b). We assume that the querying agent
has computational access only to the signature of the knowledge base, i.e., its queries are over NΣ . We
also assume that the querying agent has the same reasoning capacity as R. Since we assume that R is
complete, this is not a restriction. The querying agent may log the history of all the answers to its queries
and draw conclusions from it. Moreover, we assume that the querying agent has access to the TBox T .
Fig. 1. The Secrecy-preserving Query-answering Framework
Example 3. (Example 2, cont.) For the given KBΣ1 = 〈A1, T1〉, consider the secrecy set S1 = {CancerRisk(Jane)}.
Here, the querying agent is the insurance company and the queries include CancerRisk(Jane) and Reim-
burse(Jane). Because CancerRisk(Jane) can be inferred from statements 12, 2 and 3 in A1, at least one of
these assertions, e.g., statement 12, should be put into the envelope. Thus, HasMutBRCA1(Jane)∈ ES1. 
2.6 Secrecy Maintenance System
Before any query is posed to Σ, we compute a set of sub-expressions of all the concepts and roles appearing
in Σ and S, denoted by SubC. We initialize A∗, the assertional closure of Σ, and then compute the secrecy
envelope ES, both restricted to SubC. A∗ and ES form a secrecy maintenance system.
Once A∗ and ES have been computed, if C ∈ SubC, we can answer the query C(a) in linear time depending
on its membership of A∗ and ES. Otherwise, we need to expand SubC by adding sub-expressions of C that
are not in SubC and update the consequences A∗ as well as ES accordingly.
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3 Initializing Secrecy Maintenance System
In this section, we discuss the initialization of the secrecy maintenance system in detail.
3.1 Computing SubC
SubC, the set of certain sub-expressions of all the concepts and roles appearing in Σ or S, is defined as
follows:
– if C(a) ∈ A ∪ S, then C ∈ SubC;
– if C v D ∈ T , then {C,D} ⊆ SubC;
– if r(a, b) ∈ A ∪ S, then r ∈ SubC;
– if C1 u · · · u Ck ∈ SubC where either Ci ∈ NC or Ci = ∃r.C, then Ci ∈ SubC (1 ≤ i ≤ k);
– if ∃r.C ∈ SubC, then {r, C} ⊆ SubC;
– if ∃r.C ∈ SubC and C v D ∈ T or D v C ∈ T , then ∃r.D ∈ SubC.
Note that SubC does not contain all the sub-expressions of concepts appearing in Σ or S. For example,
if C1 uC2 uC3(a) ∈ A, then {C1, C2, C3, C1 uC2 uC3} ⊆ SubC. However, C1 uC2 /∈ SubC unless there is an
assertion C1 u C2(a) ∈ A ∪ S. If a query C(a) comes along where C /∈ SubC, it will be added into SubC. As
such, the secrecy maintenance system is built up gradually depending on the history of queries. Also note
that the initial size of SubC is linear in the size of the knowledge base Σ plus the size of the secrecy set S.
3.2 Computing A∗
The ABox A∗ is initialized as A and expanded by recursively applying assertion expansion rules listed in Fig.
2. We say that A∗ is assertionally closed or that it is an assertional closure of Σ if no assertion expansion
rule is applicable. The set of all the individual names appearing in A∗ is denoted by O∗. It is initialized as
OΣ and is expanded with applications of the ∃A2 -rule. An individual a is said to be fresh (at a particular
time during the expansion process) if a ∈ NO \ O∗ (at that time). An individual a ∈ O∗ is blocked by an
individual b ∈ O∗ if a ∈ O∗ \ OΣ , b is either in OΣ or b was picked earlier than a (during the expansion
process), and {C | C(a) ∈ A∗} ⊆ {C ′ | C ′(b) ∈ A∗}. Recall that we have assumed that the querying agent
has computational access only to the signature of the knowledge base. In particular, the querying agent
cannot ask any queries that involve individual names in O∗ \ OΣ . This is referred to as Hidden Names
Assumption (HNA).
We denote by Λ the tableau algorithm which nondeterministically applies assertion expansion rules until
no further applications are possible. Since each expansion rule can be applied polynomially many times (in
the size of SubC), the computation of A∗ can be done in polynomial time. When an execution of Λ terminates,
we have an assertionally closed ABox A∗. Note that different executions of Λ may result different A∗’s which
differ only in the individual names that have been freshly chosen during the executions of Λ.
Let I1 = 〈∆, ·I1〉, I2 = 〈∆, ·I2〉 be two interpretations and N2 ⊂ N1 be finite subsets of NC ∪NR ∪NO
such that N1 \N2 ⊂ NO. A model I1N1 = 〈∆, ·I
1 |N1〉 is a semantic extension of a model I2N2 = 〈∆, ·I
2 |N2〉 if
(I1N1)N2 = I2N2 . The following theorem shows the soundness the tableau algorithm Λ.
Theorem 1. (Soundness) Let A∗ is an assertionally closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying Λ. ∀C ∈
C ∩SubC, ∀a ∈ O∗, if C(a) ∈ A∗, then for every model INΣ of Σ, there is a semantic extension of INΣ that
satisfies C(a).
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uA1 -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ A∗ and Ci(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {Ci(a)} where 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
uA2 -rule: if {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A∗, C1 u · · · u Ck ∈ SubC
and C1 u · · · u Ck(a) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {C1 u · · · u Ck(a)};
∃A1 -rule: if {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗, ∃r.C ∈ SubC and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
∃A2 -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗, a is not blocked and for all b ∈ O∗, {r(a, b), C(b)} * A∗,
then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {r(a, c), C(c)} where c is fresh, and O∗ := O∗ ∪ {c};
vT -rule: if C(a) ∈ A∗, C v D ∈ T and D(a) /∈ A∗, then A∗ := A∗ ∪ {D(a)};
Fig. 2. Assertion Expansion Rules
Proof. Let INΣ = 〈∆, ·I |NΣ 〉 be an arbitrary model of Σ. We need to show that after applying each expansion
rule, there is a semantic extension of INΣ that satisfies new assertion(s) being added to A∗. We prove it by
induction on the construction of A∗. The base case is when C(a) ∈ A. Since INΣ is a model of Σ, aI ∈ CI .
For the induction step, we use A′, O′ and I ′ = 〈∆, ·I′〉 to denote the ABox before the application of each
expansion rule, the set of individual names appearing in A′, and the model of 〈A′, T 〉, respectively. We also
denote by A′′ the ABox after the application of each expansion rule and by O′′ the set of individual names
appearing in A′′. Note that except for the case 4, O′′ = O′.
1. If uA1 -rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C1 u · · · u Ck(a) in A′ and an integer i (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
such that Ci(a) /∈ A′. After applying the rule, Ci(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ A′ implies that
aI
′ ∈ (C1 u · · · u Ck)I′ = CI′1 ∩ · · · ∩ CI
′
k . It follows that a
I′ ∈ CI′i . Therefore, I ′ satisfies the newly
added assertion.
2. If uA2 -rule is applicable, then {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A′, C1u· · ·uCk(a) /∈ A′ and C1u· · ·uCk ∈ SubC. After
applying the rule, C1u· · ·uCk(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A′ implies that aI′ ∈ CI′i (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
which is equivalent to aI
′ ∈ CI′1 ∩ · · · ∩ CI
′
k = (C1 u · · · u Ck)I
′
. It follows that aI
′ ∈ (C1 u · · · u Ck)I′
and hence I ′ satisfies the newly added assertion C1 u · · · u Ck(a).
3. If ∃A1 -rule is applicable, then {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′ and ∃r.C(a) ∈ SubC and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A′. After applying
the rule, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′′. By IH, {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A′ implies that (aI′ , bI′) ∈ rI′ and bI′ ∈ CI′ . It follows
that aI
′ ∈ (∃r.C)I′ . So, I ′ satisfies the newly added assertion ∃r.C(a).
4. If ∃A2 -rule is applicable, then ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′, a is not blocked and for all b ∈ O′, {r(a, b), C(b)} * A′.
In applying the rule, a fresh individual name c is picked and after the application, {r(a, c), C(c)} ∈ A′′.
By IH, ∃r.C(a) ∈ A′ implies that there is d ∈ ∆ such that (aI′ , d) ∈ rI′ and d ∈ CI′ . We define an
interpretation J such that cJ = d and JNΣ∪O′ = I ′NΣ∪O′ . It is obvious that JNΣ∪O′′ is a semantic
extension of I ′NΣ∪O′ and we have (aJ , cJ ) ∈ rJ and cJ ∈ CJ .
5. If vT -rule is applicable, then C(a) ∈ A′, C v D ∈ T and D(a) /∈ A′. After applying the rule, D(a) ∈ A′′.
By IH, C(a) ∈ A′ implies that aI′ ∈ CI′ . C v D ∈ T implies that CI′ ⊆ DI′ . It follows that aI′ ∈ DI′ ,
meaning that the newly added assertion D(a) is satisfied by I ′. 
To prove the completeness of Λ, we define a canonical interpretation JA∗ = 〈∆, ·J 〉 for the assertionally
closed ABox A∗ as follows:
– ∆ := O∗;
– aJ := a, for each a ∈ ∆;
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– AJ := {a | A(a) ∈ A∗} where A ∈ NC ∩ SubC;
– rJ := {(a, b) | r(a, b) ∈ A∗} ∪ {(c, b) | a blocks c and r(a, b) ∈ A∗} where r ∈ NR ∩ SubC.
The following lemma shows that JA∗ is a model of A∗.
Lemma 1. For each C ∈ C ∩ SubC and each a ∈ O∗, C(a) ∈ A∗ ⇔ JA∗  C(a).
Proof. (=⇒) Assume that C(a) ∈ A∗. We argue by induction on the structure of C. The base case is when
C ∈ NC ∩ SubC. By the definition of JA∗ , aJ ∈ CJ and hence JA∗  C(a).
If C = C1 u · · · u Ck, then since A∗ is assertionally closed, {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A∗ due to the uA1 -rule.
By IH, Ci(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ JA∗  Ci(a), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It follows that aJ ∈ CJi . Hence aJ ∈ (C1 u · · · uCi)J = CJ .
Therefore, JA∗  C(a).
If C = ∃r.C1, there are two cases:
– If ∃r.C1(a) has a witness b ∈ O∗ such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ A∗, then by definition of JA∗ , (aJ , bJ ) ∈ rJ .
By IH, bJ ∈ CJ1 . It follows that aJ ∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ . Therefore, JA∗  C(a).
– If ∃r.C1(a) does not have a witness b ∈ O∗ such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ A∗, then there must exist an
individual c that blocks a where {r(c, d), C1(d), ∃r.C1(c)} ⊆ A∗. By definition of JA∗ , (aJ , dJ ) ∈ rJ .
By IH, dJ ∈ CJ1 . It follows that aJ ∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ . Therefore, JA∗  C(a).
(⇐=) We need to show that for each C ∈ C ∩SubC and each a ∈ O∗, if C(a) /∈ A∗, then JA∗ 2 C(a). The
base case is when C ∈ NC ∩ SubC. If C(a) /∈ A∗, by the definition of JA∗ , aJ /∈ CJ . Therefore, JA∗ 2 C(a).
If C = C1 u · · · u Ck, then since A∗ is assertionally closed, C(a) /∈ A∗ implies {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} * A∗
due to the uA2 -rule. So there is a Ci such that Ci(a) /∈ A∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By IH, JA∗ 2 Ci(a). It follows that
aJ /∈ CJi . Hence aJ /∈ CJ1 ∩ · · · ∩ CJk = (C1 u · · · u Ck)J = CJ . Therefore, JA∗ 2 C(a).
If C = ∃r.C1, then since A∗ is assertionally closed, C(a) /∈ A∗ implies that there does not exist b ∈ O∗
such that {r(a, b), C1(b)} ⊆ A∗ due to the ∃A1 -rule. By the definition of rJ and IH, for each b ∈ O∗, either
(aJ , bJ ) /∈ rJ or bJ /∈ CJ1 . It follows that aJ /∈ (∃r.C1)J = CJ . Therefore, JA∗ 2 C(a). 
Corollary 1. In a canonical interpretation JA∗ , for each C ∈ C ∩ SubC, CJ = {b ∈ O∗ | C(b) ∈ A∗}.
Next lemma shows that JA∗ is also a model of the TBox T .
Lemma 2. For C,D ∈ C ∩ SubC, C v D ∈ T ⇒ JA∗  C v D.
Proof. The claim is an easy consequence of vT -rule and Lemma 1. For all subsumption C v D ∈ T ,
C(a) ∈ A∗ ⇒ D(a) ∈ A∗ by vT -rule. By Corollary 1, CJ = {b ∈ O∗ | C(b) ∈ A∗} and similarly for DJ . It
follows that CJ ⊆ DJ . 
Theorem 2. (Completeness) Let SubC be the set of sub-expressions obtained from a KB Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a
finite set of assertions S (see Sect. 3.1.). Let A∗ is an assertionally closed ABox obtained from Σ by applying
Λ. Then for all C ∈ C ∩ SubC and all a ∈ O∗, Σ  C(a)⇒ C(a) ∈ A∗.
Proof. Suppose that C(a) holds in all models of Σ. By Lemma 1, the canonical interpretation JA∗ is a model
of A∗ and hence of A. By Lemma 2, JA∗ is a model of T . It follows that C(a) holds in JA∗ . By Lemma 1,
C(a) ∈ A∗. 
Example 4. Continuing Examples 1-3 with the KB Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 and secrecy set S1 = {CancerRisk(Jane)},
by applying Λ, we obtain the assertional closure of Σ1, denoted by A∗1, as follows.
A∗1 = A1 ∪ { A(Jill), ∃is child.A(Jane), CancerRisk(Jane), has pres(Jane, a), ∃has pres.CancerDrug(Jane),
CancerDrug(a), ∃has pres.CoveredDrug(Jane), CoveredDrug(a), Reimburse(Jane) }. 
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Ignoring the issue of secrecy, we point out a difference between the reasoning of the KB reasoner R and
that of the querying agent. Consider the assertion ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ when a is not blocked and @b ∈ OΣ for
which {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗. In this case R picks a fresh individual name c /∈ OΣ as a witness for the inclusion
∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗. The querying agent only knows the existence of the witness individual without knowing the
individual name itself. Of course, for its own reasoning process, the querying agent may pick any individual
name in NO \OΣ , say d, and then force r(a, d) and C(d) to be consequences of Σ. Clearly, the reasoner R and
the querying agent are not aware of each other’s “fresh” individual names. To differentiate the assertional
closure of the KB reasoner R from the reasoning of the querying agent, we will use ·+ to denote the latter.
3.3 Secrecy in KBs
Our basic approach to designing secrecy-preserving reasoners for knowledge bases that contain sensitive
knowledge is to answer “unknown” to every query whose secrecy must be protected or from which secret
information could be deduced. Because of OWA, a querying agent cannot distinguish between an answer
“Unknown” that results from the reasoner’s incomplete information and an “Unknown” resulting from the
reasoner’s need to protect secret information. Since we have assumed that the querying agent can only ask
queries over the vocabulary NΣ , the information the reasoner needs to protect against the querying agent
need not include assertions about individuals that are not in OΣ .
Definition 2. Given a knowledge base Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S ⊆ A∗, a secrecy envelope of S,
denoted by ES, is a superset of S ⊆ ES ⊆ A∗ such that (A∗ \ES)+ ∩S = ∅ where A∗ is the assertional closure
of Σ for R and (A∗ \ ES)+ is the assertional closure of the knowledge base 〈A∗ \ ES, T 〉 for the querying
agent.
The idea behind this definition is that if the reasoner R answers every query in ES with “Unknown” and
every query in A∗ \ ES with “Yes”, the querying agent will not be able to deduce any assertions in S. A
secrecy envelope always exists. For example, A∗ is one such envelope. However, in order to be as informative
as possible, we aim to make ES as small as possible. Unfortunately, to compute a minimum envelope, i.e., an
envelope with the smallest cardinality is hard. Specifically, the decision version of the problem of computing
minimum envelopes is NP-complete.
An instance of the Minimum Secrecy Envelope (MSE) problem contains a triple 〈Σ = 〈A, T 〉,S,K〉 where
Σ is a knowledge base, A∗ is the set of consequences of Σ restricted to SubC, S ⊆ A∗ is a secrecy set, and
K ≤ |A∗| is a nonnegative integer. The question is “Is there a secrecy envelope E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A∗ and
|E \ S| ≤ K?”
Given a set of assertions E′ ⊇ S, we can verify (a) whether E′ is an envelope by recalculating (A∗ \ E′)+
and checking that it contains no assertions in S, and (b) whether |E′ \ S| ≤ K. Both tasks are doable in
polynomial time.
To show that the MSE problem is NP-hard, we reduce the Hitting Set (HS) problem to the MSE problem.
An instance of HS consists of a collection M of subsets of a finite set S and a positive integer K ≤ |S|. The
question is “Is there a subset S′ ⊆ S with |S′| ≤ K such that S′ contains at least one element from each set
in M?” W.l.o.g., we may assume that every set in M has at least two elements.
Given an instance of HS, we construct an instance of MSE, using the same constant K, as follows:
– NO = {a}, NR = ∅, NC = S
– S = {A1 u · · · uAm(a) | {A1, ..., Am} ∈ M}
– A = {A(a) | A ∈ S} ∪ S, T = ∅
– Σ = 〈A, ∅〉
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Claim. S has a hitting set S′ that hits every subset in M with |S′| ≤ K iff there is a secrecy envelope
E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A∗ and |E \ S| ≤ K.
Proof. Suppose that S has a hitting set S′ that hits every set in M and |S′| ≤ K. Then for each set
{A1, ..., Am} ∈ M, ∃Aj ∈ S′ (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Let E = S′ ∪ S. It follows that ∀A1 u · · · uAm(a) ∈ S, ∃Aj(a) ∈ E
(1 ≤ j ≤ m). By construction, Σ does not involve any roles and SubC = {C | C(a) ∈ A}. Therefore A∗ = A,
and so A∗ \ E = A \ E. Note that A \ E contains only assertions of the form C(a) where C ∈ NC . It follows
that none of assertion expansion rules is applicable to A\E, implying that (A∗ \E)+ ∩S = (A∗ \E)∩S = ∅.
It follows that E is an envelope with |E \ S| ≤ |S′| ≤ K.
Conversely, suppose that there is a secrecy envelope E such that S ⊆ E ⊆ A∗ and |E \ S| ≤ K. Then, by
Definition 2, ∀A1 u · · · uAm(a) ∈ S, ∃Aj(a) ∈ E where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. E \ S contains only assertions of the form
C(a) where C ∈ NC . This shows that S contains a subset S′ = {C | C(a) ∈ E \ S} that hits every set in M
and |S′| = |E \ S| ≤ K. 
In what follows, we provide an algorithm that computes envelopes. Based on this algorithm as well as the
HNA, we further optimize the algorithm to result a smaller envelope. To compute an envelope, we introduce
the idea of inverting assertion expansion rules. For EL with TBox, we have five assertion expansion rules
as listed in Fig. 2. For each assertion expansion rule, the resulting inverse rule is named by changing the
superscript in the name of the original rule to S. These inversion rules are called R-secrecy closure rules
and are listed in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, A∗ is the assertional closure of Σ that has been computed previously by
applying Λ; E is initialized as the given secrecy set, and expanded by using R-secrecy closure rules.
uS1 -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ A∗ \ E and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ E 6= ∅,
then E := E ∪ {C1 u · · · u Ck(a)};
uS2 -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ E and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ E = ∅,
then E := E ∪ {Ci(a)} where 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
∃S1 -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ E and {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E with b ∈ O∗,
then E := E ∪ {r(a, b)} or E := E ∪ {C(b)};
∃S2 -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, and for all b ∈ O∗ with {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗,
we have {r(a, b), C(b)} ∩ E 6= ∅, then E := E ∪ {∃r.C(a)};
vS -rule: if D(a) ∈ E, C v D ∈ T and C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, then E := E ∪ {C(a)}.
Fig. 3. R-secrecy closure rules obtained by inverting rules in Fig. 2.
We denote by ΛRS the tableau algorithm which nondeterministically applies the R-secrecy closure rules
until no further rules are applicable. When no R-secrecy closure rule is applicable, we say that E is R-closed.
It is clear that all executions of ΛRS on an input consisting of the assertional closure of a KB and a finite
set of assertions terminate and that when ΛRS terminates, E is R-closed. It is also easy to see that ΛRS takes
polynomial time in the size of its input.
Lemma 3. Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S, let A∗ be the assertional closure of Σ and suppose
that E is R-closed. Then A∗ \ E is assertionally closed w.r.t. assertion expansion rules listed in Fig. 2.
Proof. To prove that A∗ \ E is assertionally closed, we need to show that no assertion expansion rules are
applicable to A∗ \ E. We prove it by contradiction.
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– If uA1 -rule is applicable, then there is an assertion C1 u · · · uCk(a) in A∗ \E and there is Ci(a) /∈ A∗ \E
(1 ≤ i ≤ k). A∗ being assertionally closed implies that Ci(a) ∈ A∗ and so Ci(a) ∈ E. However, since E
is R-closed, due to the uS1-rule, C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ E, contradicting C1 u · · · u Ck(a) /∈ E.
– If uA2 -rule is applicable, then {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A∗\E, C1u· · ·uCk(a) /∈ A∗\E and C1u· · ·uCk ∈ SubC.
A∗ being assertionally closed implies that C1 u · · · uCk(a) ∈ A∗ and hence C1 u · · · uCk(a) ∈ E. Since E
is R-closed, due to the uS2-rule, there is Ci(a) ∈ E(1 ≤ i ≤ k), contradicting {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ⊆ A∗ \E.
– If ∃A1 -rule is applicable, then {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E, ∃r.C ∈ SubC and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗ \ E. A∗ being
assertionally closed implies that ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ and so ∃r.C(a) ∈ E. Since E is R-closed, due to the
∃S1-rule, {r(a, b), C(b)} ∩ E 6= ∅, contradicting {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E.
– If ∃A2 -rule is applicable, then ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, a is not blocked and there does not exist b ∈ O∗ such
that {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E. Together with the assumption that A∗ is assertionally closed, it follows
that for all c ∈ O∗ with {r(a, c), C(c)} ⊆ A∗, we have {r(a, c), C(c)} ∩ E 6= ∅. Since E is R-closed, due
to the ∃S2-rule, ∃r.C(a) ∈ E, a contradiction.
– If vT -rule is applicable, then C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, C v D ∈ T and D(a) /∈ A∗ \ E. A∗ being assertionally
closed implies that D(a) ∈ A∗. It follows that D(a) ∈ E. Since E is R-closed, due to vS-rule, C(a) ∈ E,
contradicting C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E. 
Corollary 2. Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S, let A∗ be the assertional closure of Σ and suppose
that E is R-closed. Then (A∗ \ E)+ ⊆ A∗ \ E.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that no assertion expansion rules are applicable to A∗ \ E. 
Corollary 3. Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S, let A∗ be the assertional closure of Σ. If E is
R-closed, then E is a secrecy envelope of S.
Proof. It follows from Corollary 2 and Definition 2. 
It turns out that ΛRS algorithm, although certainly producing an envelope, may actually result an envelope
that contains redundant information. This compromises our goal of informativeness. Specifically, even if ∃A2 -
rule is applicable to (A∗ \ ES)+, due to OWA, the querying agent can only conclude that there exists an
individual d that is the witness for ∃r.C(a) and that d /∈ OΣ . However, by HNA, the querying agent has no
computational access to individual names in O∗ \ OΣ and hence it cannot infer any information in ES. This
provides a cue that when computing a secrecy envelope, the ∃S2-rule, which inverts the ∃A2 -rule, is dispensable.
Figure 4 lists a set of secrecy closure rules, called Q-Secrecy Closure Rules, that can be used to compute an
envelope. The Q-Secrecy Closure Rules do not include the ∃S2-rule, and make one further “optimization” in
that the ∃S1-rule is replaced by the ∃S-rule in which the individual name b is restricted to be in OΣ rather
than in O∗.
When no Q-secrecy closure rule is applicable, we say that E is Q-closed. We denote by ΛQS the tableau
algorithm which nondeterministically applies the Q-secrecy closure rules until no further rules are applicable.
It is clear that all executions of ΛQS on an input consisting of the assertional closure of a knowledge base and
a finite set of assertions terminate and that when ΛQS terminates, E is Q-closed.
Lemma 4. Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a secrecy set S, let A∗ be the assertional closure of Σ and suppose that
E is Q-closed. Then A∗ \ E is closed under uA1 , uA2 , ∃A1 and vT rules for the querying agent.
Proof. The proof thatA∗\E is closed under uA1 -, uA2 - andvT -rules is similar to the proof of the corresponding
cases in Lemma 1. Here we prove that ∃A1 -rule is not applicable to A∗ \ E.
If ∃A1 -rule is applicable, then {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E, ∃r.C ∈ SubC and ∃r.C(a) /∈ A∗ \ E. A∗ being
assertionally closed implies that ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ and so we must have ∃r.C(a) ∈ E. There are two cases:
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uS1 -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ A∗ \ E and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ E 6= ∅,
then E := E ∪ {C1 u · · · u Ck(a)};
uS2 -rule: if C1 u · · · u Ck(a) ∈ E and {C1(a), ..., Ck(a)} ∩ E = ∅,
then E := E ∪ {Ci(a)} where 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
∃S -rule: if ∃r.C(a) ∈ E and {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \ E with b ∈ OΣ ,
then E := E ∪ {r(a, b)} or E := E ∪ {C(b)};
vS -rule: if D(a) ∈ E, C v D ∈ T and C(a) ∈ A∗ \ E, then E := E ∪ {C(a)}.
Fig. 4. Q-Secrecy Closure Rules
– If {a, b} ⊆ OΣ , since E is Q-closed, due to the ∃S-rule, {r(a, b), C(b)}∩E 6= ∅, contradicting {r(a, b), C(b)}
⊆ A∗ \ E.
– If {a, b} * OΣ , suppose b /∈ OΣ . This together with A∗ being assertionally closed implies that there does
not exist c ∈ OΣ such that {r(a, c), C(c)} ⊆ A∗. By HNA, the querying agent has no computational
access to b. Therefore, ∃A1 -rule is not applicable for the querying agent. If a /∈ OΣ , the querying agent
has no computational access to any of the assertions r(a, b) and ∃r.C(a). 
Theorem 3. Given Σ = 〈A, T 〉 and a finite secrecy set S, suppose that A∗ is the assertional closure of Σ.
If E is Q-closed, then E is a secrecy envelope of S.
Proof. We need to show that (A∗ \ E)+ ∩ S = ∅. Since E is Q-closed, by Lemma 2, for the querying agent,
uA1 , uA2 , ∃A1 and vT rules are not applicable to A∗ \ E.
If ∃A2 -rule is applicable to A∗ \E, then ∃r.C(a) ∈ A∗ \E, a is not blocked and there does not exist b ∈ O∗
such that {r(a, b), C(b)} ⊆ A∗ \E. Since A∗ is assertionally closed and there is no witness c ∈ OΣ such that
{r(a, c), C(c)} ⊆ A∗ \E, there is d ∈ NO \ OΣ such that {r(a, d), C(d)} ⊆ A∗. By OWA, the querying agent
can infer the existence of some satisfying individual. However, due to HNA, it can not infer which individual
it is. It follows that (A∗ \ E)+ ∩ S = ∅. 
Note that the whole initialization of the secrecy maintenance system (including the computation of SubC,
A∗ and ES) is easily seen to be doable in polynomial time in the size of the KB Σ plus the size of the given
secrecy set S.
4 Queries
In this section we assume that the three sets SubC, A∗ and ES (the latter two, restricted to SubC) have been
precomputed in the pre-query stage as described in Sect. 3.
The computation of the answer to a query of the form C(a) is given in Fig. 5. The input of the secrecy-
preserving query-answering procedure SPQA contains the TBox T in normal form, precomputed assertional
closure A∗, the query C(a) and the precomputed secrecy envelope ES.
Since sub-expressions in the concept C of the query C(a) need not appear in SubC, Line 3 in the
SPQA procedure computes sub-expressions of the concept C as defined in Sect. 3.1 and expand SubC by
adding expressions in sub(C) \ SubC. The expanded SubC will be used to update A∗ by applying assertion
expansion rules (Fig. 2) until none of them is applicable, as indicated in Line 4. As a consequence, there
may be applicable secrecy closure rules (Fig. 4), implying that ES may no longer be a secrecy envelope for
S. Therefore, we apply necessary secrecy closure rules exhaustively (Line 5).
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SPQA(T ,A∗, C(a),ES):
1. if (C /∈ SubC)
2. {
3. compute sub(C); SubC = SubC ∪ sub(C);
4. expand A∗ to SubC;
5. expand the secrecy envelope ES to SubC;
6. }




Fig. 5. Secrecy-preserving Query-answering Procedure
We denote by A∗1 the assertional closure of Σ after the application of Line 4. By Theorem 1, the newly
added assertions are entailed by Σ. We also denote by E′S the expansion of ES after the application of Line
5. By Theorem 3, since E′S is Q-closed, it is a secrecy envelope. Clearly, a single invocation of the procedure
SPQA takes polynomial time (in the sum of the sizes of its arguments).
For queries of the form r(a, b), the procedure is much simpler: if r(a, b) ∈ A \ ES, then the answer is
“Yes”; otherwise, the answer is “Unknown”. Here ES is the current secrecy envelope.
Example 5. (Example 1-4, continued) Recall that we have a knowledge base Σ1 = 〈A1, T1〉 and the secrecy
set S1 = {CancerRisk(Jane)} in Example 2.
The assertional closure of Σ1, denoted by A∗1, and one possible envelope ES1 are listed below:
A∗1 = A1 ∪ { A(Jill), ∃is child.A(Jane), CancerRisk(Jane), has pres(Jane, a),
∃has pres.CancerDrug(Jane), CancerDrug(a), CoveredDrug(a),
∃has pres.CoveredDrug(Jane), Reimburse(Jane)}.
ES1 = {CancerRisk(Jane), is child(Jane, Jill), HasMutBRCA1(Jane),
∃is child.A(Jane), ∃has pres.CancerDrug(Jane)}.
If the querying agent asks the query Reimburse(Jane), Reimburse(Jane)∈ A∗1 \ ES1, the answer to the
query is “Yes”. If the querying agent asks the query CancerRisk(Jane), since CancerRisk(Jane)∈ A∗1 ∩ ES1,
the answer to the query is “Unknown”. 
5 Summary and Discussion
Summary: In this paper, we have introduced a logic-based framework for secrecy preserving query answering
in EL knowledge bases. We have provided a polynomial time algorithm that, given an EL KB Σ, a set S of
secrets to be protected and a query q, truthfully answers the query whenever: (i) Σ  q and (ii) the answer to
q, together with the answers to any previous queries answered by the KB does not allow the querying agent to
deduce any of the secrets in S. Our approach exploits the open world semantics under which it is impossible
for the querying agent to distinguish between a scenario in which the answer to the query is “Unknown”
because of the incomplete knowledge of the KB or because of selective censoring of answers by the KB.
Our secrecy-preserving reasoning framework builds on, and substantially extends, the privacy-preserving
reasoning framework introduced by Bao et al. [5] which considered protecting class-subclass relationships in
hierarchical ontologies.
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Related Work: Problems of trust, privacy and security in information systems, including the web-based
information systems, are topics of significant current interest. Most of the work in this area falls into four
broad categories: (i) Access control mechanisms (see [18] for an overview) and logic-based policies that
control access to sensitive information based on various criteria (e.g., role of the individual) (see [6] for
a survey) or data encryption using cryptographic protocols to prevent of unauthorized access to sensitive
information (see for example, [9]); (ii) Information confinement [20], information flow control mechanisms
[14] and programming language constructs for enforcing information flow policies (see Sabelfeld and Myers
[25] for a survey); (iii) Preventing disclosure of information about specific individuals from statistical or
aggregate information about a population [12], or as a result of data mining [1, 21], or record linkage [23, 17]
or database queries [13]; and (iv) Controlled query evaluation [26] which offers a mechanism for answering
database queries without revealing secrets (see [7] for a survey). Recently, Baader et al. [3] provide an
approach to generate views for users based on their access rights. Grau and Motik [16] have studied the
problem of hiding a part of the signature of an ontology that is reused (via importing) by another ontology.
In contrast to access-control mechanisms, our approach permits the use of secrets in answering queries
when it is possible to do so without compromising secrets. Unlike in the case of work on information flow
where the main focus is on mechanisms for enforcing information flow policies or certifying compliance with
such policies by procedural programs, our focus is on mechanisms for secrecy-preserving query answering
against KBs. In contrast to work on preventing information about specific individuals from being disclosed
by statistical queries or data mining, our focus is on preventing secrets being compromised by answers
to queries that are answered using purely deductive (logical) inferences from a knowledge base. Unlike
controlled query evaluation, which, with the exception of [8], has largely focused on protecting secrets in
(typically relational) databases under the closed world assumption, our focus is on secrecy-preserving query
answering against KBs under the open world assumption. Furthermore, we focus on cooperative as opposed to
adversarial scenarios where the KB is not allowed to lie (although it is allowed to censor some of the answers).
Such scenarios naturally arise in many information sharing applications of practical interest (e.g., selective
information sharing among: different branches of government; patients, physicians, and health insurance
providers; intelligence agencies of friendly nations, etc.).
Future Work: Some natural directions for future work include: (i) design of an efficient algorithm for
computing a “tight” envelope for EL KBs, i.e., an envelope from which no statement can be dropped without
risking the possibility of secrets being compromised (such an algorithm is of interest in light of the fact that
our current algorithm is not guaranteed to produce a tight envelope and the fact that computing the minimum
envelope is NP-hard); (ii) exploration of secrecy-preserving query answering algorithms in the case of more
expressive e.g., ALC, DL-Lite, and RDF KBs; (iii) investigation of secrecy-preserving query answering in
settings with multiple querying agents, under various restrictions on communication among agents.
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